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COMMENT
ARBITRATION LAW: JURISPRUDENCE OF UNCERTAINTY
Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp.
525 U.S. 70, 119 S. Ct. 391 (1998).
Matthew L. Hicks*
Petitioner, who worked as a longshoreman for several stevedore
companies,' filed a discrimination claim under the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) 2 in the United States District Court for the District
of South Carolina. In their answer, the South Carolina Stevedores
Association and six separate stevedore companies 4 as Respondents raised
several affirmative defenses that included Petitioner's failure to process his
grievance through the collective bargaining agreement (CBA)5 and
Longshore Seniority Plan.6 Respondents moved for summary judgment
following discovery. 7 The district court dismissed the case without
prejudice and denied Petitioner's motion for reconsideration On appeal,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the

* To Mary, with love. You inspire me everyday. This case comment received the Huber
C. Hurst Award for the outstanding case comment for Spring 1999.
1. See Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 119 S. CL 391, 393 (1998).
2. See id. at 394. The Court declined to reconcile Gilmerv. Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp.,
500 U.S. 20 (1991) and Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974) and instead
established the clear and unmistakable standard for the waiver of statutory employment claims. See
id. at 394-96. Despite the sense of fairness, the standard brought to employment contracts much
remained unanswered. Visible benefits and uncertainty disguise the fact that Gardner-Denverhas
not been overruled. Applying the clear and unmistakable standard to arbitration clauses in
collective bargaining agreements represents a net loss to union members. Americans with
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12117 (1990).
3. See Wright, 119 S. Ct. at 394.
4. See id.
5. The CBA was between the International Longshoremen's Association, AFL-CIO,
representing petitioner and the South Carolina Stevedores Association (SCSA), respondent. See id.
at 393.
6. The Longshore Seniority Plan contained a grievance procedure distinct from that of the
CBA. See id. at 393-94.
7. See id. at 394. Petitioner moved for partial summary judgment in response to some of
Respondents' defenses. See id.
8. See id. The District Court's decision was based on a recommendation of the Magistrate
Judge. See id.
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holding that the CBA was voluntarily agreed to and therefore enforceable.9
Petitioner appealed and the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari." ° The Court vacated, remanded the Fourth Circuit's decision"
and HELD that because the general arbitration clause included in the CBA
did not contain a clear and unmistakable waiver of Petitioner's right to a
judicial forum, 2 the
arbitration clause did not require Petitioner to arbitrate
3
his ADA claim.

Two decades ago, federally created employment rights began to flood
courts with claims and arbitration proved a convenient tool to relieve overcrowded dockets. 4 In order to expand arbitration, the Court had to
streamline constitutional principles to accommodate non-judicial forms of
dispute resolution. 5 However, streamlining constitutional principles meant
bending the longstanding doctrines of separation of powers 6 and
procedural due process. 7 For example, the Court strained the separation
of powers doctrine by upholding legislation that permitted private citizens
to remove cases from Article III courts to non-judicial forums.' The Court
also developed a flexible due process approach that allowed for case-bycase modification of procedure to fit the needs of private parties and the
circumstances of the case.' 9 This approach is a departure from procedural
due process principles since the Fifth Amendment does not guarantee due
process of law to private agreements.20
Despite its questionablejurisprudence, the Court successfully expanded
9. See Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 121 F.3d 702 (4th Cir. 1997), rev"d, 525
U.S. 70, 119 S. Ct. 391 (1998).
10. See Wright, 119S. Ct. at394.
11. See id. at 397.
12. See id. The Court found that the Longshore Seniority Plan also lacked a clear and
unmistakable waiver. See id.
13. See id.
14. See Vicki Zick, Reshaping the Constitutionto Meet the PracticalNeeds ofthe Day: The
Judicial Preferencefor Binding Arbitration,82 MARQ. L. REv. 247, 247-48 (1998). The author
attributes the heavy case loads in federal courts to a lack of funding combined with increasing
statutory employment claims and decreasing collective bargaining. See id. at 248.
15. See id.
16. See id. at 262-63. For example, in Commodity Futures Trading Comm n v. Schor, 478
U.S. 833 (1986), the Court held that a statute allowing private citizens to invoke the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) to settle common law claims was valid. See id at 257. Also,
in Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991), the Court held in part that the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) encouraged the arbitration of statutory employment
claims. See id. at 263.
17. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30-31; Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc., 481 U.S. 252, 263
(1987); Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 326 (1985); Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 322 (1976); see also Zick, supra note 14, at 248 & 258.
18. See Zick, supra note 14, at 257-60.
19. See id at 257-58.
20. See id. at 259.
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arbitration into the realm of employment contracts.2 Employers usually
agreed to include arbitration clauses in employment contracts in exchange
for the union's promise not to strike.22 Employees have argued that, under
CBAs, individual member interests can be subordinated to the collective
interests of the members, 3 and that this subordination can result in a lost
claim due to union negligence or reasons affecting the collective good.24
Critics also have argued that CBAs use boilerplate language and thus the
waivers derived from them are less than voluntary.25 Sometimes drafters
of arbitration clauses have included the phrases "knowing waiver"26 and
"clear and unmistakable" waiver 7 to prevent unconscionability.28
According to some critics, employers have coerced employees to agree to
arbitration as a condition of employment.29 In order to avoid these unfair
practices, employees should be given the option to arbitrate after a claim
arises rather than be mandated through pre-employment agreements.3 °
Early cases, such as Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 3 ' held that
arbitration clauses did not prevent employees from bringing statutory
claims in federal court. 32 In Gardner-Denver,the petitioner filed a Title
VII employment discrimination claim after being fired. 33 After the arbitrator denied the petitioner relief, petitioner brought the Title VII claim
in federal court and appealed to the United States Supreme Court.34 In the
statute's history, the Court found that Title VII gave federal courts plenary
power to settle employment discrimination disputes.35 Next, the Court
distinguished a statutory right asserted under Title VII from a contractual
right arising under a union-negotiated contract. 36 According to the Court,

21. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 54 (1974).
22. See id.
23. Seeid at 58, n.19.
24. See John-Paul Motley, Compulsory ArbitrationAgreements in Employment Contracts
from Gardner-Denver to Austin: The Legal Uncertaintyand Why Employers Should Choose Not
to Use PreemploymentArbitrationAgreements, 51 VAND. L. REv. 687, 707 (1998).
25. See id. at 710-13.
26. See id.
at 699.
27. See Metropolitan Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Bd., 460 U.S. 693,708 (1983).
28. See Motley, supra note 24, at 707.
29. Seeid. at710.
30. See id. at 711.
31. 415 U.S. 36, 59-60 (1974).
32. See id.: see also McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 288 (1984) (rejecting
the claim that an award in arbitration precludes a federal suit); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight
Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 749 (1981) (holding that the fundamental right to a discrimination free
workplace cannot be bargained away in arbitration).
33. See Gardner-Denver,415 U.S. at 42.
34. See id. at 43.
35. See id. at 45.
36. See id. at 49-50.
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an arbitrator exceeds the scope of his powers to interpret and to apply the
CBA if he decides questions of public law."
Cases following Gardner-Denverresisted the arbitration of statutory
employment claims.3" The Court persisted, however, and declared a new
"liberal federal policy favoring arbitration" in the first four sections of the
1925 Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).3 9 Section 1 of the FAA excludes
certain employment contracts from its rules.4" The application of section
1 by lower courts has led to inconsistent results. 4 For example, some
circuits interpret the exclusion clause generally to include all types of
employment contracts.42 Conversely, the Fourth Circuit interprets section
1 to exclude all employment contracts. 43 The Sixth Circuit strikes a
balance by interpreting section 1 to include all individual contracts, but to
exclude CBAs. 4
Despite the conflicting interpretations of the section 1 exclusions,
arbitration of statutory employment claims began to take hold.45 In Gilmer
v. Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp.,46 petitioner filed an age discrimination
claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).4 7 The
Court decided the issue of whether an arbitration clause in a securities
registration application compelled an employee to arbitrate an ADEA
claim. 4' The Court determined that the burden was on the petitioner to
show that Congress intended the ADEA to compel arbitration and to forbid
a waiver to a judicial forum.49 In holding that parties did not give up their
statutory rights by settling their claims in a non-judicial forum,5" the Court

37. See id. at 53.
38. See McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best
Freight Systems, Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981).
39. See Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) of 1925, 9 U.S.C. § I et seq. (1925); Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane, Inc., 500 U.S. 20, 25 (1991).
40. See Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) of 1925,9 U.S.C. § 1 (1925). Section 1 reads in part,
"[N]othing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees,
or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." Id.
41. See Motley, supra note 24, at 691-92.
42. See id. at 692. The First, Second, Third, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and D.C. Circuits are of
this type. See id.
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. See id. at 695 (citing Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S.
477, 486 (1989); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 241-42 (1987);
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985)).
46. 500 U.S. 20(1991).
47. See id. at 23-24.
48. See id at 23.
49. See id. at 26. The text, legislative history, and general purpose of the statute proved the
burden. See id.
50. See id. at 35.
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51
identified three maj or distinctions between Gilmer and Gardner-Denver.
First, Gardner-Denverdecided the issue of whether arbitration of a claim
under a CBA waived resolution of a statutory claim in federal court.2
Gilmer, on the other hand, decided the issue of whether an agreement to
arbitrate a statutory claim was enforceable.53 Second, Gardner-Denver
involved a union-negotiated CBA, whereas, Gilmer involved an individual
employment contract between an employee and the NYSE.54 Finally, the
Court noted that Gardner-Denverwas not decided in light of the federal
policy favoring arbitration espoused in the FAA."
Since Gilmer distinguished Gardner-Denver without overruling it,
lower court decisions following Gilmer lacked consistency.56 The Fourth
Circuit attempted to settle the Gardner-Denver/Gilmerdebate by enforcing
voluntary waivers in both individual employment contracts and CBAs."
Few courts followed the Fourth Circuit,58 however, and the state of
employment contracts remained in flux. The circuits were waiting for a
clear signal from the nation's highest Court.
In the instant case, the Court had the opportunity to pacify the circuits
and to put the Gardner-Denver/Gilmerdebate to rest by deciding whether
the law would treat arbitration clauses under individual employment
contracts the same as those under CBAs.5 The Court, however, chose
another c6-rse. Instead of focusing on what type of contract parties
entered, the court focused on how the parties entered the contract.60
In deciding whether Petitioner's ADA claim could properly be settled
under the CBA, the Court first looked for a presumption of arbitrability in
the Labor Management Relations Act 6' (LMRA). 62 The presumption of
arbitrability provides that arbitration procedures should be followed in
labor disputes unless the nature of the claim is not subject to interpretation

51. See id
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. See Motley, supra note 24, at 698-99. The Fifth, Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have
generally restricted the enforcement of arbitration clauses to securities registration applications. See
id. at 698. Most of the remaining circuits enforce arbitration clauses included in individual
employment contracts when the contracts are knowingly and voluntarily entered. See id.
57. See Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, 78 F.3d 875, 885 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 519 U.S. 980 (1996).
58. See Motley, supra note 24, at 705.
59. See Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 119 S. Ct. 391, 395 (1998).
60. See id. at 396-97.
61. See id. at 395.
62. See Labor Management Relations Act of 1947,29 U.S.C. §§ 171-187(1947); Wright. 119
S. Ct. at 395.
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under the arbitration terms.6 3 The rationale behind the presumption is that
arbitrators are better able to interpret CBAs than the courts.64 The LMRA
provides that arbitration is intended for questions concerning application
and interpretation of a CBA.6" According to the instant Court, the CBA
settled questions of whether an employee was qualified for the job,
whereas, the ADA settled questions of whether the refusal to hire an
employee was a statutory violation.66 In the instant case, the Court
identified the cause of action as arising out of a statutory right, not a
contractual right.67 Since the statutory cause of action was not susceptible
to an interpretation under the arbitration clause68 and the arbitration clause
did not incorporate the ADA by reference, 69 the Court denied Respondents
the benefit of the presumption of arbitrability.7 °
The Court then considered whether unions could waive employee
rights to a judicial forum in statutory causes of action.7 Gardner-Denver
held that a union could never waive an employee's statutory rights to a
judicial forum.72 In MetropolitanEdison Co. v. NationalLabor Relations
Bd., a company could waive its employee's statutory rights if that waiver
was clear and unmistakable." In Gilmer, the Court found that the ADEA
was subject to compulsory arbitration.74 In attempting to reconcile these
cases, the Court distinguished Gilmer by pointing out that the case
involved an employee's voluntary waiver of individual rights.75 According
to the Court, the clear and unmistakable standard only applied to a union's
waiver of employee rights.76 Individual employees could not voluntarily
waive their statutory rights.77 Instead ofbuttressing the Gilmer holding, the
instant Court carved out a procedural exception for union-negotiated

63. See Wright, 119 S. Ct. at 395 (citing AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications
Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 650 (1986)).
64. See id. (citing AT&T, 475 U.S. at 650).
65. See id at 396 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 173(d)).
66. See id
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. See id. Clause 17 of the CBA reads, "It is the intention and purpose of all parties hereto
that no provision or part of this Agreement shall be violative of any Federal or State Law." Id. at
393.
70. See id.at 396.
71. See id-at 396-97.
72. See id.at 394 (citing Gardner-DenverCo., 415 U.S. at 51).
73. See id. at 396 (citing Metropolitan Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Bd., 460 U.S.
693, 708 (1983)).
74. See id. at 394-95 (citing Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23).
75. See id. at 397.
76. See id
77. See id
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contracts.78 The Court entertained arguments of whether Gilmer overruled
79
Gardner-Denver.
The Court declined to decide this question but said that
even if it was weakened, Gardner-Denverstill supported a clear and
unmistakable requirement.8 0 Ultimately, the Court left the issue of whether
Gilmer overruled Gardner-Denver in mid-argument, deciding the instant
case instead by finding an absence of a clear and unmistakable waiver.8
The Court's holding seems innocent enough: avoid deciding whether
a union's waiver of an employee's statutory rights is enforceable by
finding that no waiver existed. 2 However, by incorporating the
requirement that waivers in union-negotiated contracts meet a clear and
unmistakable standard to be enforceable, the Court may have exposed
union members to a greater likelihood of compulsory arbitration.
The clear and unmistakable waiver requirement brings a sense of
fairness to arbitration of CBAs. One way to make the process more fair for
employees is to shift the burden of waiver from the employee back to the
employer. In Gilmer, 3 the Court held that the burden was on the petitioner
to show that Congress intended the ADEA to forbid a waiver.84 Looking
at the text, legislative history, and the general purpose of the statute proved
the burden. 5 In the instant case, the requirement for a clear and
unmistakable waiver places the burden on the employer to find a waiver
supported by the language of the CBA." Because the arbitration clause in
the instant case made no mention of a waiver either directly or through
7
statutory reference, the Court found for the Petitioner.
The clear and unmistakable waiver requirement also makes the CBAs
entered more fair. Critics have argued that CBAs use boilerplate language
and that the waivers derived from the agreements are less than voluntary. 8
A clear and unmistakable waiver requirement should make employees
more aware that their rights are at stake when they enter pre-employment
contracts. Such a requirement might not go far enough, however. Some
critics have argued that requiring employees to agree to arbitration as a

78. See id.
79. See id.
at 395.
80. See id. at 396.
81. See id.
The Court interprets Clause 15(F) of the CBA to exclude anything not made part
of the agreement. See id.
at 397. Since the CBA did not include anti-discrimination requirements
the Court found no waiver. See id. The Court also interpreted Clause 17 to strengthen agreements
and found no waiver. See id.
82. See id.
at 395.
83. See Gilmer 500 U.S. at 35.
84. See id.
at 26.
85. See id.
86. See Wright, 119 S. Ct. at 396.
87. See id.
at 395.
88. See Motley, supra note 24, at 710-13.

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

(Vol. I I

condition of employment is a form of coercion. 9 In order to avoid these
unfair practices, employees should be allowed to decide whether to
arbitrate after a claim arises rather than be compelled through preemployment agreements. 90
Regardless of how fair the clear and unmistakable waiver requirement
might be to union members, it does not apply equally to employees under
individual employment contracts. 91 In the instant case, the Court held that
an individual employment contract was not susceptible to the clear and
unmistakable standard. 92 In doing so, the Court showed a preference for
union-negotiated contracts. To be sure, the rights of employees under
CBAs need to be protected since those rights may be subordinated to the
collective interests of all employees.93 Gardner-Denver held that an
arbitrator exceeds the scope of his powers to interpret and to apply a CBA
if he decides questions of public law, regardless of whether he is
arbitrating under a CBA or an individual employment contract.94 Equity
suggests that all employment contracts be afforded the right to a federal
forum for statutory claims.
In its decision, the Court failed to reconcile the disparate circuits. 95 A
major source of confusion is the section 1 exclusion clause ol" the FAA.96
Some circuits interpret the exclusion clause to mean that individual
contracts and not CBAs are included within the FAA section 1,97 while
other circuits interpret the exclusion clause to include all types of
employment contracts.98 Amidst the uncertainty, the circuit courts of
appeal might grasp the clear and unmistakable waiver as an interpretation
of section 1. One possible interpretation is that CBAs with a clear and
unmistakable waiver must be arbitrated and thus fall outside of section 1.
But such an interpretation ignores the fact that Gardner-Denverhas not
been overruled." By applying the clear and unmistakable waiver
requirement to CBAs, the Court invites the possibility that waivers in
CBAs might be more enforceable if employers were more explicit.'00
The Court declined to reconcile Gilmer and Gardner-Denver and

89. See id. at 710.
90. See id. at 711.
91. See Wright, 119S. Ct. at395.
92. See id.
93. See Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. at 58.
94. See id.at 53.
95. See Motley, supra note 24, at 692.
96. See Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) of 1925, 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1925).
97. See Motley, supra note 24, at 692.
98. See id.
99. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35 (holding that agreement to arbitrate a statutory claim was
enforceable).
100. See Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 119 S. Ct. 391, 395 (1998).
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instead established the clear and unmistakable standard for the waiver of
statutory employment claims. Despite the sense of fairness this standard
brought to employment contracts, much remains unanswered. Superficial
benefits and uncertainty disguise the fact that Gardner-Denverhas not
been overruled. Yet, the instant Court has given employers party to unionnegotiated employment contracts clearance to waive their employees'
rights to a judicial forum as long as the employer does so expressly. As a
result, applying the clear and unmistakable standard to arbitration clauses
in CBAs represents a net loss to union members.

